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The delegates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 cre-
ated an extraordinary document. The issues they confronted 
during that difficult summer in Philadelphia were complex and 
divisive. They had to decide the best way to balance power be-
tween the individual states and the new federal government; how 
Congress should regulate trade between the states and with 
other countries; the structure and jurisdiction of the federal 
court system; how the states would be represented in the na-
tional legislature and its members elected; whether to let the 
people choose the president; and what the new nation should do 
about slavery. 
James Madison, the shy intellectual from Orange County, 
Virginia, had played a central role in organizing the convention. 
Although Madison was greatly relieved that the Constitution 
had been written and approved, he knew that challenging times 
were ahead. He would be particularly worried about efforts by 
Anti-Federalists to call a second federal convention and the lack 
of concern shown by the Constitution's supporters over the pos-
sibility of such a gathering. 
Virginia was the largest state-including what is today Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, and Kentucky, with almost twice the popu-
lation of the next nearest state-and of immense political impor-
tance. Its leading citizens were among the most prominent in the 
nation. They had helped promote the movement for independ-
ence, developed much of the intellectual and philosophical 
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foundation on which the new government would be based, and 
set examples-such as providing for explicit protection of indi-
vidual rights- that other states followed. The opinions of its 
most active citizens were widely disseminated and highly influen-
tial.1 
Without Virginia, there would be no union. Its refusal to 
approve the Constitution would not only have likely given New 
York Anti-Federalists enough momentum to reject the Constitu-
tion there, it would have deprived the nation of the services of 
George Washington as the first president. Because so many people 
had agreed to the Constitution only because Washington would be-
come the first chief executive, support for the new plan would have 
quickly eroded once word spread that he was ineligible. 
Ratification in Virginia was likely to be especially difficult 
because two of its most important citizens had refused to sign 
the Constitution. and there would be strong demand there for 
another convention. Governor Edmund Randolph and George 
Mason had expressed serious concerns about the proposed plan 
throughout the Philadelphia convention. Randolph disapproved 
of the Senate's role in trying impeachments: the two-thirds ma-
jority required for Congress to override a presidential veto: the 
size of the House of Representatives: congressional authority to 
create a standing army and to pass navigation laws: and the 
vagueness of the "necessary and proper" clause giving Congress 
substantial discretion to exercise powers granted in Article L 
among other sections. Randolph also objected to the lack of a 
bill of rights. That would be its most conspicuous flaw and the 
most difficult for supporters of the Constitution to defend.' 
Mason objected for many reasons. including the failure to 
create a government that would protect the interests of the 
South. be responsive to the people, and especially because of the 
lack of a bill of rights.' Mason had been the primary author of 
the Virginia Declaration of Rights, the document approved 
along with the state constitution at the Virginia Convention of 
1776. When he criticized the lack of protection for individual 
rights in the new Constitution, he did so with special authority. 
During the final weeks of the convention, Mason announced that 
I. See generally. SAUL CORNELL. THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALIS\1 & 
THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA.1788-1828 (1999). 
2. JAMES MADISON. NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CO>.;VENTION OF 1787. 
at 614-15 (Adrienne Koch ed .. Norton 1987) (1966) (hereinafter Madison ·s Notes). 
3. Madison's Notes. supra note 2. at 630: id. at 651. See generally. JEFF 
BROADWATER. GEORGE MASON: FORGOTTEN FOL:NDER (2006 ). 
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he would "sooner chop off his right hand than put it to the Con-
stitution as it now stands."~ Coming from Mason, such a colorful 
expression of disdain for the new Constitution was guaranteed to 
be repeated in newspapers and to lodge in the memory of citi-
zens and delegates at ratifying conventions.' 
Mason had tried to convince his fellow delegates that the 
Constitution should not be forwarded to the Confederation 
Congress and the states without a statement of rights. Five days 
before the Philadelphia convention adjourned, Mason said he 
"wished the plan had been prefaced with a Bill of Rights ... It 
would give great quiet to the people." And Mason added, "with 
the aid of the State declarations [of rights], a bill might be pre-
pared in a few hours."" 
Roger Sherman, the sixty-six-year-old statesman from Con-
necticut, opposed Mason's recommendation, arguing that rights 
protected by state constitutions "are not repealed by this Consti-
tution: and being in force are sufficient. "7 And referring to the 
new federal Congress, he said the "Legislature may be safely 
trusted ... s Mason responded by warning that the "Laws of the 
U.S. are to be paramount to State Bills of Rights." Madison re-
mained silent.y 
With delegates voting as states, they unanimously rejected 
Mason's plea for a bill of rights. Fatigue was certainly a factor. 
The delegates had been hard at work for four months creating 
the Constitution. They were eager to go home to tend to per-
sonal and business matters and to report the results of their 
work. Some were concerned that instead of a few hours being 
required to prepare a list of rights, as Mason had predicted, it 
could take days or weeks and could lead to the unraveling of 
precarious compromises reached in other sections of the docu-
ment. 
But the primary objection to adding a bill of rights to the 
original Constitution was that the government to be formed un-
der it would be one of limited powers. Unlike state governments, 
which had plenary authority to act on behalf of its citizens, the 
federal Constitution would create a government whose powers 
4. Madison's Notes supra note 2. at 566. 
5. Brent Tarter. George Mason and the Conserl'lltion of Liberty. 9') VIRGINIA 
MAGAZI:\E OF HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY, 292-97 ( 1991 ). 
6. Madison's Notes. supra note 2. at 630. 
7 /d. 
K /d. 
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would mostly be confined to those authorized in the document. 
Because the plan did not repeal individual rights protected in 
state constitutions, and because the new general government had 
no authority to abuse such rights, there was no need to grant 
them explicit protection. Moreover, once a list was begun, it 
would be inevitable that some important rights would be left off. 
This would suggest that the federal government was authorized 
to abridge such rights since, it may be assumed. only the enu-
merated ones would be entitled to constitutional protection. 
~o one defended this argument more eloquently than Alex-
ander Hamilton. He did so not at the convention, but a few 
months later in Federalist 84. Hamilton wrote that a bill of rights 
would be ''not only unnecessary in the proposed constitution. 
but would even be dangerous.'' And he asked, ''why declare 
things shall not be done, which there is no power to do? Why, 
for instance, should it be said, that the liberty of the press shall 
not be restrained. when no power is given by which restrictions 
may be imposed?" 10 
Mason did not have an opportunity at the convention to 
challenge this position, but if the debate had continued, he 
would have asked a question for which supporters of the Consti-
tution would have no easy answer. If Hamilton believed that the 
Constitution did not permit the new government to oppress in-
dividual liberty and therefore no list of rights was needed, why 
then were certain rights protected in the original document? For 
example, the Constitution preserved the right to a jury in a 
criminal trial and prohibited bills of attainder (laws imposing 
criminal penalties by a legislative body without involvement of 
the courts) and ex post facto laws (punishing acts that were not 
criminal at the time they were committed). Why, Mason would 
have asked, would the new government be prohibited from vio-
lating the rights not listed? 
Hamilton's answer was that those sections of the Constitu-
tion "in favour of particular privileges and rights" adopt the 
"common and statute law of Great Britain, by which many other 
rights, not expressed, are equally secured."11 And he concluded 
that the "constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to 
every useful purpose, a Bill of Rights." 12 
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 84. at 445 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey and 
James McClellan eds., 2001). 
11. /d. at 443. 
12. /d. at 447. See also LANCE BANNING, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THREE 
CONVERSATIONS FROM THE FOUNDI!\G 8-13 (2002). 
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The decision not to include a list of individual rights was a 
misjudgment on the part of supporters of the Constitution that 
would have dire consequences, some of which could be seen 
immediately at the Philadelphia convention. Even as the docu-
ment was being finalized, several prominent delegates demanded 
that a second constitutional convention be held to correct what 
they considered to be serious defects in the Constitution they 
were writing. It had been a substantial undertaking to organize 
this first convention and to bring it to a successful conclusion. A 
second convention could create political instability, even chaos. 
A few weeks before the convention adjourned, George Ma-
son warned that if his concerns were not addressed, "his wish 
would then be to bring the whole subject before another general 
Convention." 13 Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania agreed, tell-
ing the delegates "he had long wished for another Convention, 
that will have the firmness to provide a vigorous Government, 
which we are afraid to do. ,H Governor Randolph also supported 
another convention. He told his colleagues that if the final form 
of the Constitution was such that he could not sign it, then "State 
[ratifying] Conventions should be at liberty to propose amend-
ments to be submitted to another General Convention which 
may reject or incorporate them, as shall be judged proper. '' 1' 
Randolph repeated this argument a week before the Consti-
tution was signed, interrupting the discussion of how the docu-
ment should be submitted to the states for ratification. Randolph 
said that "State Conventions should be at liberty to offer 
amendments to the plan; and that these should be submitted to a 
second General Convention, with full power to settle the Consti-
tution finally. "16 
Randolph was determined to be heard on this subject, if not 
at the convention in Philadelphia, then in the months ahead as 
state ratifying conventions debated the Constitution. When his 
colleagues seemed to ignore his plea and resumed their discus-
sion of the plan for ratification, Randolph again tried to get them 
to focus on a second convention. "Was he to promote the estab-
lishment of a plan which he verily believed would end in Tyr-
anny?" the governor asked.'7 He urged the delegates to support 
his motion for submitting the Constitution to state legislatures, 
13. Madison's Notes, supra note 2,at 566. 
14. /d. at 567. 
15. /d. 
16. /d. at 612. 
17. /d. at 615. 
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which in turn would give it to "State Conventions having power 
to adopt reject or amend; the process to close with another Gen-
eral Convention with full power to adopt or reject the alterations 
proposed by the State Conventions, and to establish finally the 
Government. ,,x Benjamin Franklin then seconded Randolph's 
motion without elaborating.'~ If someone of Franklin's stature 
were to publicly support a second convention. the chances that 
one would be called would be increased. 
Two days before the Constitution was signed, Randolph 
again urged his colleagues not to submit the document in its cur-
rent form. He moved "that amendments to the plan might be of-
fered by the State [ratifying] Conventions, which should be sub-
mitted to and finally decided on by another general 
Convention. "20 Randolph warned that "should this proposition 
be disregarded, it would ... be impossible for him to put his name 
to the instrument."21 Mason seconded the motion, arguing that 
''This Constitution had been formed without the knowledge or 
idea of the people. A second Convention will know more of the 
sense of t~e p,eople, and be able to provide a system more con-
sonant to 1t. , __ 
It was left to Charles Pinckney of South Carolina to respond 
to the demands for a new convention, and he did so two days be-
fore adjournment. He cautioned his colleagues that the "states 
will never agree in their plans [of proposed amendments], and 
the Deputies to a second Convention coming together under the 
discordant impressions of their Constituents, will never agree. 
Conventions are serious things, and ought not to be repeated. '' 23 
The last to comment on the subject was Elbridge Gerry, the 
influential political figure from Massachusetts who explained 
why he-along with Randolph and Mason-would withhold his 
signature from the Constitution. After identifying his objections 
to the plan, he said the "best that could be done" to fix the Con-
stitution was to "provide for a second general Convention. "2• 
The delegates. voting as states, unanimously rejected Randolph's 
. " motiOn.-
18. /d. 
19. /d. 
20. /d. at 651. 
21. /d. See also. id. at 567: and id. at 612. 
22. /d. at 651. 
23. /d. See generally. GORDON S. WOOD. THE CREATION OF THE AMERICA'< 
REPL'BLIC: 1776-1787. at 306-43 (1969). 
2-1. Madison's Notes. supra note 2. at 652. 
25. /d. 
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Article V, the amending provision of the Constitution, 
would turn out to be of critical importance during the ratification 
period. Not only could no Bill of Rights be proposed by Con-
gress without it, it also was the authority for organizing a second 
constitutional convention. Yet despite its significance, the Phila-
delphia delegates gave it relatively little attention.26 
Some at the Constitutional Convention even suggested that 
no amendment mechanism was needed. After all, of the original 
thirteen states. the constitutions of five of them contained no 
such provision.27 Perhaps because these state constitutions were 
written during a time of revolutionary fervor. their framers may 
have believed that replacing a constitution rather than amending 
it provided the best way to institute a new government when- to 
paraphrase the Declaration of Independence-it became de-
structive of the people's rights."H 
The first time the issue of amending the Constitution was 
raised was four days after the Philadelphia convention began 
when Governor Randolph presented the Virginia Plan. Resolu-
tion XIII of the plan suggested that "provision ought to be made 
for the amendment of the Articles of Union whensoever it shall 
seem necessary, and that the assent of the National Legislature 
ought not to be required thereto."29 The Convention did not dis-
cuss the amending process again until early June, when Elbridge 
Gerry said he favored a process for amending the Constitution, 
arguing that the "novelty & difficulty of the experiment requires 
periodical revision. "30 
A week later, Article V began to take shape. According to 
Madison's notes, "several members did not see the necessity of 
the Resolution [XIII of the Virginia Plan] at all, nor the propri-
ety of making the consent of the Natl Legisl. unnecessary."31 
George Mason strenuously objected to any suggestion that an 
26. For an insightful discussion of Article V. see Michael Stokes Paulsen. A General 
Theory of Article V: The Constitlltional Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment. 103 
YALE L.J. 677 (1993) and AKHIL REED AMAR. AMERICA's CONSTITUTION: A 
BIOGRAPHY 285-99 (2005). Amar argues that Article Vis not the exclusive method for 
proposing and ratifying amendments and that the people. as ultimate sovereigns. have 
the authority to initiate and complete the process outside of the requirements of Article 
v. 
27. JOHN R. VILE. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROCESS IN AMERICAN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT25 (1992). 
28. See generally. WILLI PAUL ADAMS. THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 
137-42: 298-99 (2001 ). 
29. Madison's Notes. supra note 2. at 33. 
30. /d. at 69. 
31. /d. at 104. 
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amending provision should be left out of the Constitution, insist-
ing that the ··plan now to be formed will certainly be defective, 
as the Confederation has been found on trial to be. Amend-
ments therefore will be necessary. and it will be better to provide 
for them. in an easy. regular and Constitutional way than to trust 
to chance and violence." Mason worried about giving Congress 
the sole power to propose amendments: "It would be improper 
to require the consent of the Natl. Legislature. because they may 
abuse their power. and refuse their consent [to amendments] on 
that very account. "'2 The delegates agreed that the Constitution 
would include an article on amendments. but they postponed a 
decision on what the role of Congress would be. 
What became the amending section of Article V was written 
mostly by the Committee of Detail. which was given the respon-
sibility of drafting the actual language of the Constitution to re-
flect the votes and debates of the Convention. Because so many 
of the resolutions agreed to by the delegates in the first months 
of the Convention were general in nature, the committee had 
substantial discretion when transforming those resolutions into 
specific language. The Committee included for the first time a 
provision requiring Congress to call a convention to "revise or 
alter" the Constitution upon the submission of petitions from 
two-thirds of the states. Perhaps in reaction to Mason's state-
ment about an oppressive Congress obstructing constitutional 
reform. the committee did not give Congress the authority to 
propose amendments or call a convention on its own. When the 
Convention delegates- voting by state- unanimously adopted 
the committee's language, Gouverneur Morris objected to ex-
cluding Congress. He did not want Congress to have to wait for 
the states to request such a gathering, arguing that the "Legisla-
ture should be left at liberty to call a Convention, whenever they 
I ,. '1 pease.··· 
Only a week before the Constitution was signed, the dele-
gates again debated Article V. By a 9-1 vote, with one state di-
vided, the Convention accepted Gerry's recommendation that 
the amending provision be reconsidered because of the possibil-
ity that a majority of states could "bind the Union to innovations 
that may subvert the State Constitutions altogether."34 Alexan-
der Hamilton, who had been away for much of the summer and 
32. /d. at 104-05. 
33. /d. at 560. 
34. /d. at 609. 
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who, at times. seemed uninterested in the proceedings when he 
was there, made an important and likely influential argument 
that Congress should be more involved in the amending proc-
ess.'' He seconded Gerry's motion and persuaded his colleagues 
that it would be dangerous to leave it solely in the hands of state 
legislatures and argued that Congress should not only be able to 
propose amendments. but call a convention as well. He told his 
colleagues that: 
the State Legislatures will not apply for alterations but with a 
view to increase their own powers. The National Legislature 
will be the first to perceive and will be the most sensible to the 
necessity of amendments, and ought also to be empowered. 
whenever two-thirds of each branch should concur to call a 
Convention:'" 
The delegates discussed the role of Congress and state legis-
latures in proposing and ratifying amendments. One of the cru-
cial decisions they made was to narrowly reject the requirement 
that two-thirds of states ratify proposed amendments, choosing 
instead the stricter requirement of three-fourths.'7 
Madison, who was busy taking notes and had said little dur-
ing this discussion, felt compelled to ask several important ques-
tions that the delegates were either too tired to answer or that 
they assumed future generations would work out. He wanted to 
know "How was a Convention to be formed? by what rule de-
cide? what the force of its acts?"" Madison was troubled by the 
lack of guidance provided by the Constitution on how a second 
convention would be organized and would conduct its business. 
Madison then offered a motion, seconded by Hamilton. to 
give Congress the authority to propose amendments by a two-
thirds vote in each house, but not the power to call a convention. 
The motion meant that amendments could be offered by either 
Congress or a convention organized after two-thirds of the states 
submitted petitions. Ratification for both methods would be by 
three-fourths of state legislatures or state conventions. With one 
state divided, the delegates approved the Madison motion 9-1.39 
35. Rossiter wrote that Hamilton was "[f]ar and away the most disappointing" 
delegate at the convention and that he "had so much to give. and he gave so little." 
CLINTON ROSSITER. 1787: THE GRA;-.iD CONVEJ'\TION. 252-53 (Norton 1987) (1966). 
36. Madison's Notes. supra note 2. at 609. 
37. /d. at 610. Under Article V, Congress chooses whether amendments-proposed 
by itself or a convention- will be ratified by state legislatures or state conventions. 
38. /d. at 609. 
39. /d. at 610-11. 
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After the delegates added several additional sections-
guaranteeing states their representation in the Senate and pro-
tecting the importation of slaves until 1808-Article V was ap-
proved . .j() The amending section of the Constitution was finally in 
place. but not everyone was pleased with it. George Mason ob-
jected to the exclusion of the people from any role in directly 
proposing or ratifying amendments. Mason said that "no 
amendments of the proper kind would ever be obtained by the 
people, if the Government should become oppressive."41 
Article V was a compromise between the overly strict re-
quirements of the Articles of Confederation-which required all 
state legislatures to give their approval to amendments-and 
making it so easy to alter the Constitution that it would be de-
prived of the stability necessary to be firmly established as the 
nation's charter of government. Madison later argued in Federal-
ist 43 and 49 that changing the Constitution- especially using the 
convention method for proposing amendments-should be ap-
proached cautiously:" 
When he helped write the Federalist essays, Madison could 
not have known that within the next two years, his home state 
and New York would formally petition Congress to hold a con-
vention. and Anti-Federalists would use various forums to de-
mand such an assembly. When Article V was being debated in 
Philadelphia. Madison was less attuned to the potential prob-
lems of such a gathering. After Morris and Gerry moved to add 
a provision to Article V to require a convention on the applica-
tion of two-thirds of the states, Madison suggested that such a 
provision was not necessary because he "did not see why Con-
gress would not be as much bound to propose amendments ap-
plied for by two thirds of the States as to call a Convention on 
the like application. ''43 But then he agreed that an alternative to 
Congress proposing amendments would be acceptable, telling his 
colleagues that ''he saw no objection however against providing 
for a Convention for the purpose of amendments, except only 
that difficulties might arise as to the form, the quorum &c. which 
in Constitutional regulations ought to be as much as possible 
avoided. ,.w 
40. /d. at 649-50. 
41. /d. at 649. 
42. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 43.49 (James Madison). 
43. Madison's :"Jotes. supra note 2. at 649. 
44. /d. 
2007] SECOND CONVENTION MOVEMENT 577 
The Constitution was published in Virginia newspapers be-
ginning a few days after it was signed.~' By early November. the 
proposed plan had been printed twice in pamphlet editions, 
twice in broadsides-one or two page documents similar to small 
posters-and in at least six of Virginia's nine newspapers:6 
It did not take long for those who objected to the Constitu-
tion to make their views known. As early as September 25. eight 
days after the convention adjourned, John Dawson, a legislator 
and lawyer from Fredericksburg, Virginia. wrote to Madison that 
"altho there are many warm friends to the plan, be assurd that 
the opposition will be powerful."~7 Five days later, Governor 
Randolph told Madison that the opposition would be "formida-
ble. ,4!l 
As the fall of 1787 continued, Madison wrote letters to sup-
porters and encouraged them to discuss with as many people as 
possible the arguments in favor of ratification. In mid-
November, he sent George Washington the first seven essays of 
The Federalist, and all but admitted that he was one of the au-
thors of the essays written under the name "Publius ... He asked 
Washington to send the papers to his "confidential correspon-
dents" at Richmond so they could be reprinted there.~" Washing-
ton complied with this request and before the end of the year. 
the essays began appearing in Virginia newspapers.'" 
Madison and other supporters of the Constitution tried to 
slow the momentum toward a convention by arguing that it 
would take far longer for amendments to be proposed by a con-
vention than by Congress. During the time the convention proc-
ess dragged on, state governments and foreign nations would not 
know the eventual form the Constitution would take. Because a 
second convention would likely consider both personal rights 
and structural amendments, it was possible that proposed 
changes would drastically alter the relative power of the states 
and new federal government. Foreign nations would be hesitant 
45. R-10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATIO~ OF THE 
COI"STITUTION. Ratification of the Constitution bv the States (Virginia. Vols. I-III) 17-
18 (John P. Kaminski and Gas pare J. Saladino eds. ·!9RX-1993) (hereinafter DHRC) 
46. /d. at 19. 
47. Letter from John Dawson to James Madison (Sept. 25. 17X7). in 10 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON at 173 (Robert R. Rutland ed .. 1962) (hereinafter. PJM vol. 10). 
4X. Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Sept. 30. 17X7). supra note 
47. at 182. 
49. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Nov. IX. 17X7). supra note 
47. at 254. 
50. DHRC. supra note 45. at IX0--83. 
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to loan money during a period of such uncertainty, and the dan-
ger that some states would form regional confederacies would 
increase.'1 Madison told George Lee Turberville that a second 
convention would propose too many amendments and would 
consider itself "as having greater latitude than the Congress ap-
pointed to administer and support as well as to amend the sys-
tem.,,, Madison doubted that "the deliberations of the body [a 
second convention] could be conducted in harmony, or termi-
nate in the general good."'' As Madison also explained to Henry 
Lee, amendments were "much more attainable from Congress 
than from attempts to bring about another Convention.""~ 
In October 1787, the Virginia General Assembly met to en-
act a law authorizing the calling of a ratifying convention and the 
procedures under which the delegates would be chosen. One of 
the most contentious issues was whether the ratifying convention 
would be able to propose amendments to the Constitution. After 
the House approved a bill to hold a convention, it was discov-
ered that something was missing from the statute. The resolution 
did not provide for the expenses of convention delegates. On the 
last day in November, the House of Delegates debated how to 
compensate those who would travel to Richmond and spend 
most of the month of June debating the Constitution."' 
Anti-Federalists, who controlled the General Assembly by a 
substantial margin, saw an opportunity to further efforts to or-
ganize a second federal convention. They agreed that the dele-
gates to the ratifying convention had to be paid, but they also 
adopted, over strenuous objections from pro-Constitution mem-
bers. the policy of reimbursing delegates who incurred expenses 
by traveling to confer with convention delegates in other states. 
Anti-Federalists clearly believed that defeating the Constitution 
required a multi-pronged attack and that communication with 
other opponents around the country was essential. They wanted 
both to influence those in other states and to learn what objec-
tions to the Constitution were raised at their ratifying conven-
tions. Anti-Federalists hoped that as concerns mounted in other 
51. See Letter from George Washington to David Stuart (Nov. 30. 1787) in DHRC. 
supra note 45. at 193-94. 
52. Letter from James Madison to George Lee Turberville (Nov. 2. 1788) in 11 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON at 331 (Robert R. Rutland ed .. 1962) (hereinafter PJM vol. 
11) 
53. /d. 
54. Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (Nov. 30. 1788) id. at 372. 
55. DHRC. supra note 45. at 185. 
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states, Virginia's delegates would become increasingly appre-
hensive about approving the new plan of government. 
But the Anti-Federalists did not stop there. One of them, 
Samuel Hopkins, Jr., who represented Mecklenburg County in 
the House of Delegates, introduced a resolution not only to pro-
vide for "the expences or allowance" of delegates to the June 
convention, but also to reimburse "deputies to a federal conven-
tion, in case such a convention should be judged necessary."'' 
Supporters of the Constitution had reason to be concerned. 
It was troublesome enough that the delegates in Richmond 
would be able to propose amendments, thus suggesting that the 
largest state believed that immediate changes to the Constitution 
were needed. Now Virginia was going on record as implicitly 
planning for a second constitutional convention to add amend-
ments to the work of the Philadelphia delegates even before the 
Constitution was ratified. Madison criticized these efforts by the 
General Assembly: 'The only surprize I feel at the last steps 
taken with regard to the new Constitution, is that it does not 
strike the well meaning adversaries themselves with the necessity 
of some anchor for the fluctuations which threaten shipwreck to 
our liberty. "57 And he knew everything his state did on this sub-
ject would be important: "The vote of [Virginia] ... will either 
dismember the Union, or reduce her [Virginia] to a di-
lemma ... mortifying to her pride ... [There is] difficulty and dan-
ger in every Stage of [this] ... experiment."'' 
The debate raged over the next few weeks. The House of 
Delegates, meeting as a committee of the whole, initially ap-
proved the resolution allowing delegates to the ratifying conven-
tion to propose amendments. confer with other states, and, if 
necessary, to appoint deputies to a second constitutional conven-
tion. After the debate, the final bill that would enact Hopkins's 
proposal deleted explicit references to a second convention or to 
delegates conferring with other conventions. But the amended 
bill was vague enough for the Anti-Federalists still to claim that 
the General Assembly had reserved the right to send delegates 
to a second convention. It provided for "Such reasonable ex-
56. !d. at 184-86. 
57. Letter from James Madison to Archibald Stuart (Dec. 14. 1787) in PJM vol. 10. 
supra note 47. at 325. See Letter from Rufus King to Jeremiah Wadsworth (Dec. 23. 
1787) in DHRC. supra note 45. at 258: and Letter from George Washington to James 
Madison (Jan. 10. 1788) in PJM vol. 10. supra note 47. at 357-58. 
58. Letter from James Madison to Archibald Stuart (Dec. 14. 1787) in PJM vol. 10. 
supra note 47. at 325-26. 
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penses as may be incurred in case the [ratifying] Conven-
tion ... should deem it necessary to hold any Communications 
with any of the sister states ... or should in any other manner in-
cur any expence in collecting the sentiments of the union re-
specting the proposed Federal Constitution. "59 The bill was 
passed unanimously on December 11 and the Senate, which also 
had a majority opposed to the Constitution, accepted the meas-
ure the next day. 
Patrick Henry, a member of the House of Delegates and a 
dominating force in the General Assembly, thought this lan-
guage left too much to chance because it did not specifically au-
thorize the paying of expenses of those attending a second fed-
eral convention. He knew that if Virginia formally recognized 
the potential need for a convention, it would greatly enhance the 
demand for such a gathering, which had already been made by 
leading fi£ures around the country. including Governor 
Randolph. Henry declared his intention to propose a bill spe-
cifically about a convention. The House Journal does not pro-
vide details about the proceedings of the committee of the 
whole, but apparently enough members objected to including an 
explicit funding provision for a constitutional convention that it 
was removed from the language of the final legislation. Henry 
would have to be content with the imprecise language of the 
original bill."1 
Archibald Stuart. a member of the House, recognized the 
advantage of not explicitly stating whether expenses should be 
paid for delegates to attend a federal convention. He told Madi-
son that it was better that the law providing for payment to the 
delegates "be made in General terms which should not discover 
the sense of the house on ye Subject. ""c Stuart was also relieved 
that most other states would have already decided whether to 
approve the Constitution by the time of the June [ratifying] con-
59. For amendments to the bill. see DHRC supra note 45. at 189. For the final bill. 
see 191. After the words "Federal Constitution." the General Assembly added this lan-
guage: .. in such manner as to keep up that friendly intercourse and preserve that unanim-
ity respecting any great change of government. which it is the duty and wish of the legis-
lature to promote and cherish."" !d. at 191. 
60. See generally. Richard E. Ellis The Persistence of Antifederalism after 1789 in 
BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN 
NATIONAL IDENTITY 295-314 (Richard Beeman. Stephen Botein. and Edward C. Carter 
II eds .. 1987). 
fil. DHRC. supra note 45. at 184-85. 
fi2. Letter from Archibald Stuart to James Madison (Dec. 2. 1787) in PJM vol. 10. 
supra note 47. at 291. 
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vention, "for I now have my doubts whether She [Virginia] 
would afford them as usual a good Example.""' 
Although Anti-Federalists around the country were calling 
for amendments, opponents of the Constitution in Virginia were 
the most active in demanding them. Shortly after the Philadel-
phia convention ended and Congress forwarded the Constitution 
to the states, Richard Henry Lee sent Sam Adams a detailed ex-
planation of the defects of the Constitution- particularly the 
lack of protection for individual rights-and told the Massachu-
setts patriot that a new convention could make the necessary 
changes: "Why may not such indispensable amendments be pro-
posed by the [state ratifying] Conventions and returned With a 
new plan to Congress that a new general Convention may so 
weave them into the proffer'd system as that a Web may be pro-
duced fit for freemen to wear?" Lee wondered why there was 
such a hurry to approve the current version of the Constitution, 
''as if the subject of Government were a business of passion, in-
stead of cool, sober, and intense consideration. ,1>4 
A week later, Lee notified Randolph that he was joining the 
call for a second convention, asking the governor that "If with 
infinite ease, a convention was obtained to prepare a system, 
why may not another with equal ease be procured to make 
proper and necessary amendments?'' Lee reminded Randolph 
that "Good government is not the work of a short time, or of 
sudden thought.""' He asked the governor to join him in propos-
ing amendments and to ''suggest the calling of a new convention 
for the purpose of considering them. "06 
But a few months later, Lee was having second thoughts 
about whether a convention was the best way to obtain amend-
ments. He recommended that the Richmond convention pass a 
motion giving Virginia, if it ratified the Constitution, the discre-
tion to rescind that ratification if amendments were not forth-
coming. He told George Mason that amendments "may be ob-
tained from the new Congress without endangering a total loss 
of the proposed constitution." Lee suggested that if amendments 
were not proposed within "two years after the meeting of the 
new Congress, that Virginia shall, in that case, be considered as 
disengaged from this ratification." It would be safer, Lee said, 
63. !d. 
64. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams (Oct. 5. 1787) in DHRC. su-
pra note 45. at 38. 
65. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph (Oct. 16. 1787) id. at 61. 
66. !d. at 64. 
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for Congress to propose amendments because it could be done 
.. without risking the convulsion of conventions. ""7 
As the drive for a second convention gained momentum. 
supporters of the Constitution began to worry that enough states 
would ask that a convention be held prior to ratification or that a 
sufficient number would formally petition Congress under Arti-
cle V if the Constitution had been ratified. Federalists knew that 
a second convention could be disastrous. Edward Carrington 
was one of the first to sound the alarm. telling Thomas Jefferson 
that unlike the first convention, the delegates to the second 
would arrive with specific and inflexible orders from their state 
legislatures, thus making compromise difficult. A new conven-
tion would be "clogged with instructions and biassed by the pre-
sentiments of their constituents," Carrington warned."' 
Madison knew firsthand what it had taken to organize and 
conduct the first convention, and he was understandably worried 
about what a second would do. A few months before the Vir-
ginia ratifying convention met, he tried to persuade Randolph to 
reconsider his position. Madison told the governor that a: 
conditional ratification [by Virginia] or a second convention 
appears to me utterly irreconcileable in the present state of 
things with the dictates of prudence and safety ... a second ex-
periment [convention] would be either wholly abortive. or 
would end in something much more remote from your 
[Randolph's] ideas and those of others who wish a salutary 
Government. than the plan [Constitution] now before the 
public. 
Madison told Randolph that those determined to defeat the 
Constitution would use the new convention to ··carry on their 
schemes, under the mask of contending for alterations." Madi-
son especially worried about efforts by prominent Virginia Anti-
Federalists-such as Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee and 
George Mason- to coordinate plans for a new convention with 
opponents of the Constitution in New York: "Every danger of 
this sort might be justly dreaded from such men as this state 
[Virginia] and N. York only could furnish, playing for such a 
purpose. into each others hands.""9 
67. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to George Mason (May 7. 1788) id. at 785-86. 
Sec also Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Pendleton (May 26. 1788) id. at 880. 
68. Letter from Edward Carrington to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 23. 1787) id. at 95. 
69. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (April 10. 1788) in PJM vol. 
II. supra note 52. at 19. 
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Madison had the same message for Jefferson. informing the 
U.S. envoy in Paris that the "Constitution and the Union will be 
both endangered'' if a second convention were held. Madison 
did not expect the "same spirit of compromise will prevail" in a 
second convention as the ''amicable result'' of the first. As he 
had told Randolph, those who had "latent views of disunion" 
could use a demand for new amendments as a way of attaining 
their goals.70 Later, using even stronger language. Madison de-
scribed to Jefferson the potential dangers of another convention. 
He told his fellow Virginian that it would be "composed of men 
who will essentially mutilate the system. particularly in the arti-
cle of taxation ... An early Convention is in every view to be 
dreaded in the present temper of America. "71 
The Virginia ratifying convention, meeting in Richmond in 
June 1788, would provide center stage for some of the most im-
portant political figures of the era. Despite advancing age and 
health problems, Patrick Henry would stand on his feet for hours 
at a time while exhorting. scolding and occasionally berating his 
fellow delegates. He had no faith in his opponents' promise that 
if Virginia approved the Constitution unconditionally, they 
would see to it that the First Congress offered amendments. In 
Henry's view, the Philadelphia delegates had made it almost im-
possible to change the Constitution. ''To encourage us to adopt 
it [the Constitution], they tell us that there is a plain easy way of 
getting amendments: When I come to contemplate this part. I 
suppose that I am mad, or, that my countrymen are so: The way 
to amendment, is. in my conception. shut," declared Henry.7 ' He 
considered the idea of approving the Constitution first. then ask-
ing for amendments, "absurd": "I am at a loss what to say. You 
agree to bind yourselves hand and foot-For the sake of 
what?-Of being unbound. You go into a dungeon-For what? 
To get out. Is there no danger when you go in, that the bolts of 
federal authority shall shut you in?"7 ' 
Henry did not know at the time that New Hampshire would 
become the ninth state to ratify, on June 21, 1788, four days be-
fore Virginia's ratification vote. With New Hampshire's ap-
proval, the Constitution went into effect, replacing the Articles 
of Confederation. Any convention held outside the provisions of 
Article V -even if organized by such prominent Anti-Federalists 
70. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (April 22. 171ili) id. at 21i. 
71. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 23. 1788) id. at 238. 
72. June 5. 1788. in DHRC. supra note 45. at 955. 
73. June 9. 1788. id. at 1070. 
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as Henry and Lee, and endorsed by supporters of the Constitu-
tion such as Governor Randolph-would have no legal standing. 
Furthermore, if Virginia rejected the Constitution and remained 
out of the union, it could not petition Congress under Article V 
to call a convention for the purpose of proposing amendments, 
and it could not vote to ratify or reject amendments proposed by 
Congress. 
Henry hoped that if Virginia rejected the Constitution or 
ratified contingent upon the proposing of amendments by either 
a convention or the First Congress, one of two developments 
would take place: The states that had not yet voted on the Con-
stitution would freeze the ratification process by also demanding 
amendments before giving their approval; or some states that 
had already ratified would be so moved by Virginia's principled 
stand in defense of civil liberties that they would rescind their 
endorsement until amendments were offered.74 
At the ratifying convention, Governor Randolph defended 
his position on the Constitution and urged ratification. He also 
continued the demand he had made in Philadelphia, that a sec-
ond convention be held to propose amendments. Anti-
Federalists at the Richmond convention and Governor 
Randolph may not have agreed on much, but they did share the 
view that Virginia should work with other states to organize a 
new convention. Early in the Richmond proceedings, Patrick 
Henry told the delegates that under Article V, it would be nearly 
impossible to secure amendments and that a second convention 
was needed prior to ratification. First, he doubted whether Con-
gress would propose them: "The most unworthy characters max 
get into power and prevent the introduction of amendments."'' 
Then, Henry argued, even if two-thirds of state legislatures sub-
mitted petitions, there was no guarantee that a convention would 
be called. He doubted that even if a convention proposed 
amendments that they would be ratified: "There must necessar-
ily be some designing bad men: To suppose that so large anum-
74. Lance Banning. Virginia: Sectionalism and the General Good. in RATIFYING 
THE CONSTITUTION 262. 285, and 234--64 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch 
eds .. 1989) (hereinafter G&L). At its convention in July 1788. North Carolina voted by a 
two-to-one margin neither to ratify nor reject the Constitution. thus handing Federalists 
a serious defeat. Willie Jones, who led the North Carolina convention to this "state of 
suspended indecision" -in the words of Rutland-was influenced by Anti-Federalists in 
Virginia. ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND. THE ORDEAL OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE 
AKTIFEDERALISTS AND THE RATIFICATION STRUGGLE OF 1787-1788. at 275 (1983) 
(1966) 
75. Patrick Henry (June 5. 1788). in DHRC. supra note 45. at 955. 
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ber as three-fourths of the States will concur, is to suppose that 
they will possess genius. intelligence and integrity. approaching 
to miraculous."7" Henry reminded the convention that ''four of 
the smallest States, that do not collectively contain one-tenth 
part of the population of the United States, may obstruct the 
most salutary and necessary amendments."77 
George Nicholas, who supported the Constitution, tried to 
reassure Henry and other Anti-Federalists at the ratifying con-
vention, telling them that if Congress refused to approve 
amendments, a second convention could be called. And he 
added, "It is natural to conclude that those States who will apply 
for calling the Convention, will concur in the ratification of the 
proposed amendments." Nicholas seemed overly optimistic 
when he said that the delegates to the new convention "will have 
their deliberations confined to a few points;-no local interests 
to divert their attention;- nothing but the necessary altera-
tions. "7H 
Francis Corbin, another supporter of the Constitution, told 
opponents at the Virginia convention that if they insisted on rati-
fication contingent upon the approval of amendments. a second 
constitutional convention would have to be immediately called 
to propose them. 
Admitting this state [Virginia] proposes amendments previ-
ous to her adoption [of the Constitution], must there not be 
another Federal Convention? Must there not be also a Con-
vention in each state? Suppose some of our proposed condi-
tions to be rejected79 will not our exclusion out of the Union be the consequence?" 
In the final week of the ratifying convention, Madison im-
plored his colleagues not to consider a federal convention to 
propose amendments. He noted that the "mutual deference and 
concession" that had marked the Philadelphia convention would 
be absent from a new one: "It is a most awful thing that depends 
on our decision-no less than whether the thirteen States shall 
unite freely, peaceably, and unanimously, for the security of 
their common happiness and liber~, or whether every thing is to 
be put in confusion and disorder!" 
76. !d. at 956. 
77. /d. 
7R. George Nicholas (June 6. 178R). in DHRC. supra note 45. at I 002. 
79. Francis Corbin (June 7. 17RR). in DHRC. supra note 45. at 1015. 
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Madison recognized that a list of forty amendments had 
been circulating among Anti-Federalists at the Virginia ratifying 
convention. Twenty related mostly to a bill of rights. while an-
other twenty provided largely for structural changes in the pro-
posed government. "Will not every State:· Madison asked . 
.. think herself equally entitled to propose as many amend-
ments?"'\ Madison warned those opposed to the Constitution 
that if they insisted on another convention. they might end up 
with something worse than the plan they oppose: .. 1 would de-
clare it [liberty and happiness of the people] more safe in its pre-
sent form [the proposed Constitution]. than it would be after in-
troducing into it that long train of alterations which they call 
amendments .... : 
Shortly before the vote on ratification. Patrick Henry ap-
pealed one last time to delegates not to ratify the Constitution 
without requiring the approval of amendments. He urged the 
delegates to support amendments in a "manly. firm and resolute 
manner."'' But in comments that were unexpectedly concilia-
tory. Henry also said that if he was on the losing side. he would 
not oppose the new system: 
If I shall be in the minority. I shall have those painful sensa-
tions. which arise from a conviction of being overpowered in a 
good cause. Yet I will be a peaceable citizen!- My head. my 
hand. and my heart shall be at liberty to retrieve the loss of 
liberty. and remove the defects of that system-in a constitu-
tional way.- I wish not to go to violence, but will wait with 
hopes that the spirit which predominated in the revolution. is 
not yet gone. nor the cause of those who are attached to the 
revolution yet lost- I shall therefore patiently wait in expec-
tation of seeing that Government changed so as to be com-
patible with the safety, liberty and happiness of the people."' 
81. I d. See also Madison's comments on June 6. id. at 994-95. 
82. James Madison (June 24. 1788). in DHRC. supra note 45. at 1501. 
83. ld. 
84. ld. Madison commented to Alexander Hamilton that Henry "declared previous 
to the final question that although he should submit as a quiet citizen. he should wait 
with impatience for the favorable moment of regaining in a constillltional way. the lost 
liberties of this country." (Emphasis in original). Letter from James Madison to Alexan-
der Hamilton (June 27. 1788), in PJM vol. 11. supra note 52. at 182. See also. Letter from 
James Madison to George Washington (June 27. 1788) id. at 182-83. The Philadelphia 
Independent Gazetteer observed on July 2. 1788. that Henry "has been powerfuL but now 
appears to be content." in DHRC. supra note 45. at 1698. See also. Letter from William 
~elson. Jr.. to William Short (July 12. 1788) id. at 1701-D3. Washington wrote to Tobias 
Lear about Henry's professed support for implementing the Constitution: ''Mr. Henry it 
seems having declared that. though he can not be reconciled to the Government in its 
present form. and will give it every constitutional opposition in his power: yet, that he 
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Henry apparently believed the vote would be close. and he 
might not prevail. His remarks sounded like the words of a sea-
soned politician preparing to fight another day. But Madison and 
his allies could not count on victory even after Virginia ratified 
the proposed plan. Henry's emphasis on continuing his battle in 
a "constitutional way" meant to Madison that opponents would 
use ··every peaceable effort to disgrace & destroy" the Constitu-
tion and would immediately ask state legislatures to petition 
Congress under Article V to call a second constitutional conven-
tion. As Madison told Hamilton just after the convention ended. 
''My conjecture is that exertions will be made to engage 2/3ds of 
the Legislatures in the task of regularly undermining the gov-
ernment."'' He wrote to Washington the same day to warn that 
Henry's plan would be to organize a second convention through 
the petition process or to "get a Congress appointed in the first 
instance that will commit suicide on their own Authority."'" 
A few months after the ratifying convention. the Virginia 
General Assembly met in its fall 1788 session to establish proce-
dures for the selection of presidential electors. to choose U.S. 
senators. to enact a law providing for election of members of the 
House, and to consider whether to formally petition Congress to 
call a second convention. Those demanding such a gathering may 
not have thought through what would be required to organize a 
convention and to consider any amendments proposed by it. 
Anti-Federalists in the Virginia General Assembly argued 
that it would take longer for Congress to propose amendments 
than a convention. They also expected that Congress would not 
propose radical enough amendments. something they considered 
worse than mere delay. Included in the second convention reso-
lution eventually approved by the legislature was this statement: 
The anxiety with which our Countrymen press for the accom-
plishment of this important end [securing amendments], will 
ill admit of delay. The slow forms of Congressional discussion 
and recommendation. if indeed they should ever agree to any 
change, would we fear be less certain of success. Happily for 
their wishes, the Constitution hath presented an alternative. 
by admitting the submission to a Convention of the States. To 
this therefore we resort, as the source from whence they are 
will submit to it peaceably: as every good citizen he thinks ought. .. Letter from George 
Washington to Tobias Lear (June 29. 1788) id. at 1715-16. 
85. Letter from James Madison to Alexander Hamilton (June 27. 1788). in PJM vol. 
11. supra note 52. at 182. 
86. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (June 27. 1788) id. at 183. 
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to derive relief from their present apprehensions.'7 
Anti-Federalists clearly believed that a convention. to which 
state legislatures would likely send carefully instructed delegates, 
would propose amendments to limit the power of the new fed-
eral government that Congress would not offer. 
As the House met as a committee of the whole, Henry in-
troduced a resolution to appoint a committee to draft a request 
to Congress for a convention. He also wanted his colleagues to 
answer a "Circular Letter" that had been approved by the New 
York ratifying convention in July.&i The letter, which sought the 
cooperation of other states to help organize a federal conven-
tion, was a compromise between supporters and opponents at 
the convention, who were closely divided.HY New York Anti-
Federalists eventually corresponded with opponents of the Con-
stitution in South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, 
Pennsylvania and New Hampshire.90 
New York's efforts revived an interest in a second conven-
tion that had receded since February 1788. when Massachusetts 
had agreed to ratify the Constitution with recommended 
amendments. The so-called "Massachusetts compromise" gave 
Anti-Federalists the opportunity to formally request the First 
Congress to consider amendments without having to go through 
the long and complicated second convention process. Once the 
New York ratifying convention called for a convention and dis-
tributed the Circular Letter, interest in a new convention re-
sumed. Eventually, New York followed Massachusetts and in-
cluded recommended amendments.91 
Federalists in the Virginia General Assembly resisted ef-
forts to coordinate plans with New York. On October 30, 1788, 
they offered a substitute motion where no convention would be 
called, but Congress would be encouraged to propose amend-
ments to "conform to the true spirit" of the Virginia Declaration 
87. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS: 1788-
1790. at 275-76 ( Gordon DenBoer ed .. 1984) (hereinafter. DHFFE): DHRC. supra note 
45. at 1765-66. 
88. Linda Grant DePauw, The Anticlimax of Antifederalism: The Abortive Second 
Convention Movement, 1788-1789. in PROLOGUE: THE JOURNAL OF THE NATIOJSAL 
ARCHIVES (Fall 1970). 103: Banning. supra note 74. at 329: and STEVEN R. BOYD. THE 
POLITICS OF OPPOSITION: ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 131-35 (1979). 
89. PAUL J. WEBER & BARBARA A. PERRY. UNFOUNDED FEARS: MYTHS AND 
REALITIES OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 40-45 (1989). 
90. Cornell. supra note 1. at 137. 
91. 1d. at 136. 
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of Rights and other amendments approved by the Virginia rati-
fying convention."= This motion was defeated 85 to 39. Support-
ers of the Constitution also did not want the Virginia legislature 
to send a letter to other states asking them to petition Congress 
for a convention. as recommended by opponents, so they offered 
a substitute letter that would call on states to pressure Congress 
to propose amendments, but that motion was defeated 72 to 50, 
demonstrating the solid control of the House of Delegates by the 
Anti-Federalists. Patrick Henry's resolution, petitioning Con-
gress for a convention, was then approved by a voice vote. As 
George Lee Turberville described Henry's efforts, "the Cloven 
hoof begins to appear. . .intrigue antifederalism and artifice go 
hand in hand.''"' 
Supporters of the Constitution again tried to stop the Gen-
eral Assembly from requesting a convention when the report of 
the committee of the whole was presented to the full house. 
They argued that the Richmond convention had preferred 
amendments offered by Congress. and that the "Assembly ought 
not to divert the course of their pursuit. ""• The House rejected 
the pleas of the Federalists and adopted the committee's resolu-
tion and letters to the other states."' After the Senate made mi-
nor changes to which the House agreed, the resolution was com-
pleted and sent to the governor so he could forward it '"to the 
new Congress, as soon as they shall assemble" and the letters to 
the other states sent "without delay.""" 
Henry had very little opposition to his efforts in the House. 
Richard Bland Lee. a supporter of the Constitution, told Madi-
son at the end of October that Federalists in the legislature "be-
ing all young & inexperienced- form but a feeble band against 
92. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CO:--iGRESS (Charlene Bangs 
Bickford et al.. eds .. 1992) (hereinafter DHFFC). in DHFFE. supra note 87. at 74. 276-
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94. Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Nov. 15. 1788). in PJM vol. 
11. supra note 52. at 345: and in DHFFE. supra note 87. at 276-77. See also. Letter from 
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him.··"- Lee had hoped to modify Henry's motion. '"so as to di-
vest it of its inflammatory dress-or to postpone its operation to 
such a distant period as to give the people of America a fair ex-
periment of the government.""' But the supporters failed, as 
George Lee Turberville told Madison: "The triumph of Antifed-
eralism is compleat. ,.'1'1 
The Virginia General Assembly. on November 20. 1788, ap-
proved a resolution by a margin of 85 to 39 to be "presented to 
Congress ... requesting that Honorable Body. to call a Convention 
of deputies from the several States" to consider the amendments 
they recommended and to "report such amendments, as they shall 
find best calculated to answer the purpose. ""x' 
Madison was appalled that the legislature of his state had 
formally requested a second constitutional convention. He 
probably did not expect that enough other states would follow 
Virginia's and New York's lead to force a new convention right 
away, but he thought it highly irresponsible for legislators to 
take any chance that the Constitution would be altered by poten-
tially dozens of amendments offered through such a gathering. 
As he explained to Henry Lee, 
The measures pursued at Richmond are as impolitic as they 
are otherwise exceptionable- if alterations of a reasonable 
sort are really in view, they are much more attainable from 
Congress than from attempts to bring about another Conven-
tion. It is already decided that the latter mode is a hopeless 
• J(JJ pursmt. 
Madison was also concerned that supporters of the Consti-
tution seemed willing to consider a second convention to pro-
pose amendments. George Lee Turberville, who represented 
Richmond County in the Virginia House of Delegates from 
1785-1789, told Madison that a convention is "talked of even by 
the staunchest friends to the new Constitution, to close With N 
York & propose another convention to amend. "102 Four days 
97. Letter from Richard Bland Lee to James Madison (Oct. 29. 1788). in PJM vol. 
11. supra note 52. at 323. 
98. !d. 
99. Letter from George Lee Turberville to James Madison (Nov. 10. 1788) id. at 
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100. DHRC. supra note 45. at 1767. 
101. Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (Nov. 30, 1788). in PJM vol. 11. supra 
note 52. at 372. 
102. Letter from George Lee Turberville to James Madison (Oct. 20. 1788) id. at 
309. 
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later. Turberville wrote again to tell Madison that there was 
"Much talk of closing with New York in her proposal for a new 
convention. Prima facie-1 see no impropriety in it."'"' 
In a detailed letter responding to Turberville, Madison set 
out his objections to a second convention. He acknowledged that 
the Constitution was '"not a faultless work.'' and he told Turber-
ville he wished amendments had been included before the Con-
stitution was completed in Philadelphia.''4 Some changes. Madi-
son noted. could be added with little controversy. but those that 
have "both advocates and opponents" should "receive the light 
of actual experiment. before it would be prudent to admit them 
into the Constitution. " 111' 
Madison gave four reasons why a second federal convention 
should not be called: First, delegates at such a convention would 
disagree about the merits of the proposals and the proper 
method for obtaining them; thus there would be ··unquestiona-
bly a number of States who will be so averse and apprehensive as 
to the mode, that they will reject the merits rather than agree to 
the mode." Second, although Article V required Congress to call 
a convention upon receiving petitions from two-thirds of the 
states. all states would probably have to participate in such a 
convention for it to be successful. In Congress. on the other 
hand, the process for enacting amendments was much simpler 
and less cumbersome: A single legislator could introduce 
amendments, and members of Congress. unlike delegates to a 
convention. could act without instructions from their state legis-
latures.(("' Third, a convention would not be as restrained as Con-
gress because the legislature is chosen to "administer and sup-
port as well as to amend the system.,. Therefore. 
If a General Convention were to take place for the avowed 
and sole purpose of revising the Constitution, it would natu-
rally consider itself as having a greater latitude than the Con-
gress .. .it would consequently give greater agitation to the 
public mind; an election into it would be courted by the most 
violent partisans on both sides ... [and] would no doubt con-
tain individuals of insidious views who under the mask of 
seeking alterations popular in some parts ... might have a dan-
gerous opportunity of sapping the very foundations of the 
103. Letter from George Lee Turberville to James Madison (Oct. 24. 1788) id. at 
316. 
104. Letter from James Madison to George Lee Turberville (Nov. 2. 17811) id. at 330. 
105. !d. 
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Madison knew from experience how difficult it was to reach con-
sensus at a constitutional convention: "Having witnessed the dif-
ficulties and dangers experienced by the first Convention which 
assembled under every propitious circumstance. I should trem-
ble for the result of a Second. meeting in the present temper in 
A · .. 1oo men ca. 
Finally. Madison worried that European nations would con-
sider a second convention to be a "dark and threatening Cloud 
hanging over the Constitution just established, and perhaps over 
the Union itself:' 1 '~'~ He believed that foreign countries would be 
reluctant to develop relations with the United States during this 
period of uncertainty. He cited a loan from Holland that was 
granted only because it expected the Constitution to be "speed-
ily. quietly. and finally established." 110 
After the Virginia General Assembly voted to request a 
convention, Madison reported to Jefferson that two-thirds of the 
legislators were "enemies to the Government." He wanted Jef-
ferson to know that some friends of the Constitution also sup-
ported amendments. but "they wish the revisal to be carried no 
farther than to supply additional guards for liberty, without 
abridging the sum of Rower transferred from the States to the 
general Government." 11 The opponents, on the other hand, were 
"zealous for a second Convention, and for a revisal which may 
either not be restrained at all, or extend at least as far as altera-
tions have been proposed by any State." 112 
Madison also knew that the calling of a convention would 
require substantially more time than for Congress to approve 
amendments. Two-thirds of states would have to submit peti-
tions to Congress. Congress would then have to schedule a con-
vention. Delegates to such a convention would have to be se-
lected by either state legislatures or voters. They would have to 
convene, agree on potentially dozens of amendments and then, 
as required by Article V, submit those amendments to state leg-
islatures or state conventions for ratification. In some states, 
where legislatures met infrequently, governors would have to 
107. !d. 
lOR !d. 
109. !d. 
I ](J. !d. at 332. 
Ill. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 8. 1788) id. at 382. 
112. !d. at 382-83. 
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call a special session to prevent a long delay in considering pro-
posed amendments. If Congress chose state conventions for rati-
fication, it would be delayed while elections were held to choose 
the delegates to the conventions. Months would pass while the 
elections were conducted and the conventions organized. This 
entire process could take several years, during which time there 
would be great uncertainty about the future of the Constitution 
and the nation. 
A few months later, when Madison was running for election 
to the U.S. House in a district teeming with Anti-Federalists-
that Henry had created to prevent Madison from being 
elected- he wrote to an influential Baptist minister, George 
Eve, to further explain his objection to a second convention. He 
told Rev. Eve that unlike a convention. Congress "will probably 
be careful not to destroy or endanger" the new government. But 
a convention, explained Madison. "meeting in the present fer-
ment of parties, and containing perhaps insidious characters 
from different parts of America, would at least spread a general 
alarm, and, be but too likely to turn every thing into confusion 
d . .,,JJ~ an uncertamty. · 
Once in Congress, Madison had to again confront efforts to 
hold a second convention. Virginia's petition to Congress. ap-
proved in November, had been followed by New Y ark's request 
a few months later. 11 ~ On May 5, a few weeks before Madison in-
troduced what would become the Bill of Rights. his fellow con-
gressman from Virginia, Theodorick Bland- an ally of Patrick 
Henry-presented to the House Virginia's petition calling for a 
convention to consider "'the defects of this Constitution that 
have been suggested by the state Conventions. and report such 
amendments thereto, as they shall find best suited to promote 
our common interests, and secure to ourselves and our latest 
posterity, the great and unalienable rights of mankind. " 11 ' 
Bland was an energetic Anti-Federalist. A doctor from 
Prince George County who had served in the Confederation 
Congress and the Virginia House of Delegates, he had voted 
against ratification at the Virginia convention. He had often op-
posed Madison and was apparently so popular in his district that 
113. Letter from James Madison to George Eve (Jan. 2. 17R9). in PJM vol. 11. supra 
note 52. at 405. 
114. DePauw. supra note RR. at 107. 
115. 10 DHFFC. supra note 92. at 451. 
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Federalists put up only token opposition in his race for Con-
11' gress. 
The next day John Laurance, a representative from New 
York City, placed before the House New York's resolution ask-
ing for a new convention to propose amendments securing per-
sonal rights. He did not explain why a Federalist, who would 
presumably be opposed to a second convention, introduced the 
document. Laurance may have been simply carrying out an obli-
gation he believed he owed the state legislature to deliver the 
resolution. 117 
The introduction of the two petitions drew Madison into a 
debate he certainly would have preferred to avoid. His primary 
purpose in offering the amendments that became the Bill of 
Rights was to prevent the calling of another constitutional con-
vention. Now he was faced with having to discuss two petitions 
for just such a convention, one from his home state, and one 
from the state that was hosting the national government. Madi-
son had to be careful not to dismiss them too quickly by suggest-
ing that the petitions should simply be filed without Congress 
taking any action on them. On the other hand, if Congress took 
the petitions too seriously, it could encourage other states to 
submit their own, with the possibility that enough would do so to 
reach the two-thirds required by Article V for the calling of a 
convention. 
Bland wanted the Virginia petition and list of amendments 
proposed by the ratifying convention to be submitted to the 
committee of the whole House so they could be considered 
along with Madison's amendments. Rep. Elias Boudinot, an in-
fluential Federalist from New Jersey who had once been the 
president of the Confederation Congress, argued that the peti-
tions and amendments should be available for members to con-
sult but that Congress should not take formal action until a suf-
ficient number of states had presented them.m 
Bland was not satisfied. He argued that whether or not 
other states "'would come forward," if the House had Virginia's 
petition before it when amendments are considered, "it might 
have some proper influence in their decision, tho' it were not ac-
companied by other applications. " 119 
116. DHFFE. supra note 87. at 359. 364. 
117. 10 DHFFC supra note 92. at 472. 
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Madison said the House should respect the decision of the 
Virginia General Assembly to request a second convention, but 
that any formal action should be consistent with the require-
ments of the Constitution. He noted that "Congress had no de-
liberative power with respect to a convention." When two-thirds 
of states requested such a gathering, Congress was ''bound to 
call one." Until enough states did so, the House and Senate have 
"no power whatever to enter into the subject-The best mode 
was to let it [the Virginia petition] lie upon the table till a suffi-
cient number of applications appeared. ,leu Considering that 
Madison had played a significant role in the debate at the Phila-
delphia convention that led to the final language of Article V, his 
reasoning no doubt carried weight with many of the members of 
the House. 
This could have been the end of the discussion, but Bland 
and Boudinot continued to disagree about what should be done 
with the petitions. Boudinot did not see how it would be "paying 
any respect to Virginia to commit their application to a body 
which had no power to deliberate or decide upon it," while 
Bland said again that if the House accepted the petitions and 
considered them along with the proposed amendments, there 
would be no violation of the Constitution. 121 As the argument 
continued, Rep. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts suggested that 
the debate over the treatment of the petitions should wait until 
the amendments themselves were discussed. 1c2 Finally, with 
Madison and Bland agreeing, the House decided to enter the pe-
titions into the journal and keep the originals on file in the 
clerk's office, thus taking no immediate action on them. 
Gerry was one of many members of the House who be-
lieved Congress had more important business to attend to than 
amendments but he did not want to see them postponed for too 
long. He agreed with those who said it was "improper to take up 
the business [of amendments] at this time, when our attention is 
occupied by other important objects," but unlike some of his col-
leagues, he considered the matter to be of great urgency, and he 
proposed that amendments be the focus of the House's attention 
on July 1, a few weeks in the future. 1c3 Gerry agreed with Madi-
son that if the First Congress did not seem serious about consid-
ering amendments, more state legislatures would join the call of 
120. !d. 
121. /d. 
122. !d. at -+46. 
123. !d. at 830. 
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New York and Virginia for a second constitutional convention. 12~ 
Despite his earlier opposition to the Constitution. Gerry had 
pragmatically concluded that it was as good as the new nation 
was likely to get: "I am not, sir, one of those blind admirers of 
this system, who think it all perfection: nor am I so blind as not 
to see its beauties. The truth is, it partakes of humanity: in it is 
blended virtue and vice, errors and excellence." If amendments 
were proposed by a second convention. "we run the risk of los-
ing some of its best properties. "1" 
Madison's colleague from Virginia, John Page. argued 
strenuously that if Congress did not act, the people and their leg-
islatures would think seriously about petitioning for a second 
convention. And he added, "How dangerous such an expedient 
would be, I need not mention, but I venture to affirm. that unless 
you take early notice of this subject. you will not have the power 
to deliberate. The people will clamor for a new convention, they 
will not trust the house any longer. '' 12" 
Thomas Sumter, an Anti-Federalist from South Carolina. 
rallied to Madison's cause. He had opposed the Constitution at 
his ratifying convention, but now said. "I consider the subject of 
amendments of such great importance to the Union, that I 
should be glad to see it undertaken in any manner. " 127 He be-
lieved that referring the subject to a select committee-which is 
what the House eventually did-would be "treating the applica-
tions of the state conventions rather slightly," and he preferred 
the full House consider the subject. Sumter worried about what 
would happen if amendments were not proposed: "I think it will 
give fresh cause for jealousy: it will rouse the alarm which is now 
suspended, and the people will become clamorous for amend-
ments. " 12" And, Sumter added, at that point, people would no 
longer apply to Congress for amendments: they would "resort to 
the other alternative [a convention] pointed out in the constitu-
tion.~~~~" 
Thomas Tudor Tucker of South Carolina criticized his col-
leagues for not showing sufficient deference to the amendments 
proposed by state conventions and legislatures and neglected by 
the select committee, which had been assigned the task of sort-
124. !d. at 831. 
125. !d. 
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127. !d. at 834. 
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ing through the amendments submitted by the states and report-
ing to the House. He said the states that offered amendments 
"would feel some degree of chagrin at having misplaced their 
confidence in the general government" and would be disap-
pointed that important rights to which their citizens were enti-
tled would be left unprotected. 1'" He warned his colleagues that 
the failure to act could result in a second convention, and that 
"we may lose many of the valuable principles now established in 
the present constitution.,])] He predicted that ratification by 
three-quarters of the states-which would know that their rec-
ommended amendments had not been seriously considered by 
the House- would be unlikely. L'' The House rejected, by a mar-
gin of 34 to 16, Tucker's motion to consider the additional 
amendments. 133 
The debate over amendments was passionate. Rep. George 
Leonard of Massachusetts described the tense atmosphere by 
noting that the "Political Thermometer [is] high Each Day.,~..~ 
Rep. John Brown of the Kentucky territory of Virginia said he 
was not surprised that Gerry, Tucker and others were "deter-
mined to obstruct & embarrass the Business as much as possi-
ble."m The speaker of the House, Frederick Muhlenberg of 
Pennsylvania. said he hoped ·'this disagreeable Business is fin-
ished." He noted that Anti-Federalists such as Gerry and Tucker 
had "thrown every Obstacle they could'' by recommending nu-
merous amendments, although they knew there was no chance 
they would be approved by two-thirds of the members, yet their 
plan was to "favour their darling Question for calling a [second 
federal] Convention." 1)" 
The approval of 12 amendments by the First Congress re-
moved the immediate threat of a second constitutional conven-
tion.m Many Anti-Federalists, such as Patrick Henry, Richard 
Henry Lee, and William Grayson, were not satisfied that 
amendments dealing almost exclusively with personal rights 
were proposed, rather than structural amendments that would 
have altered the relative power of the states and federal gov-
130. 11 DHFFC. supra note 92. at 1297. 
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ernment. But Anti-Federalists were badly outnumbered in the 
First Congress and were unable to persuade their colleagues to 
offer amendments they hoped would reduce the chances the new 
government would be unaccountable. They also could not main-
tain interest in a convention after the Bill of Rights was ratified 
in December 1791. Once North Carolina and Rhode Island 
agreed to join the union-after having refused until Congress 
proposed amendments-there was less incentive to continue the 
effort to call a convention. The adoption of the Bill of Rights ef-
fectively ended the drive for such a convention.138 
If a second convention had been held during the ratification 
period-a time of great political uncertainty-Article V's lack of 
specificity would have added to the potential chaos that such a 
convention could have caused. Many steps were involved that 
would have been taken without much guidance from the Consti-
tution. 
To organize a new convention, nine of thirteen states would 
have had to petition Congress. Because ten of thirteen states 
would have to ratify amendments proposed by the convention, 
the bare minimum of nine requesting the convention may not 
have been enough to see the process through. 
Article V is silent on the form and scope of the petitions. 
The petitions would likely vary, with some states explicitly listing 
the amendments they were demanding, while others would limit 
the petition to calling for a convention to consider amendments. 
Virginia and New York did not list specific amendments in their 
petitions. 139 But Virginia's petition made reference to the forty 
amendments recommended by the ratifying convention, and 
New York's made a more general statement about amendments 
needed to improve the Constitution.140 If petitions included 
amendments, a key issue to be resolved by the convention would 
be whether delegates could consider only those amendments. 
States would then have to choose delegates to attend the 
convention. State legislatures would most likely reserve for 
themselves the right to select them. Many of the delegates to the 
second convention would arrive with specific instructions on 
what amendments to support or oppose. Some states would deny 
138. DePauw, supra note 88, at 105-06. 
139. Veit, supra note 133, at 235-38. 
140. For a discussion of the New York ratifying convention. see Cecil L. Eubanks, 
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their delegates any discretion to compromise on issues directly 
affecting them. 141 
In Virginia, the delegates to the new convention would 
likely have been energetic opponents of the Constitution. In the 
fall of 1788, Anti-Federalists dominated the Virginia General 
Assembly. Patrick Henry-who controlled the House and had 
substantial influence over the Senate-would likely have chosen 
himself, Richard Henry Lee, William Grayson, and perhaps 
James Monroe to represent Virginia. Madison would not have 
been selected and would almost certainly have declined had he 
been offered the appointment. George Washington, who pre-
sided over the first convention, would not have agreed to return, 
and after April 1789, as president, he would not think it appro-
priate for the chief executive to attend a constitutional conven-
tion. Other states would have sent a mixture of opponents and 
supporters of the Constitution. 
Unlike the first convention, the second would probably 
have been open to the public, and a large crowd may have been 
vocal and animated when expressing its sentiments about the 
proposals being debated. With the delegates committed to fixed 
positions and a boisterous gallery, it would have been difficult 
for the convention to draft amendments of the same quality that 
would be proposed by the First Congress. They may not have 
been able to agree on any amendments. 
Article V does not say how such a convention would be 
conducted. There would be disagreement over whether amend-
ments need to be approved by a majority or super-majority at 
the convention and over other procedural issues. Committees 
would have to sort through the hundreds of recommendations 
submitted by the states and delegates and to write the language 
of specific amendments. 
Once the convention decided on amendments, Congress 
would-if it followed the language of Article V -forward them 
to the states. The Constitution gives Congress the option of 
choosing whether the amendments will be ratified by state legis-
latures or state conventions. If Congress chose conventions, 
states would decide whether delegates to the conventions would 
be appointed by the legislature or elected by the people. There 
would be intense demand from citizens for the right to elect 
delegates to the convention. The campaigns for election to the 
141. See Cornell. supra note 1, at 150-51. 
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conventions would last at least several months. Then the conven-
tions would need to be held and after what would likely be 
lengthy debates. votes would be taken on whether to ratify the 
proposed amendments. A frantic effort would be undertaken by 
delegates at one convention to find out what was transpiring at 
others. Meanwhile, the nation and foreign governments would 
not know what drastic changes the Constitution would undergo. 
The entire process could take several years. Rather than put 
the nation through this ordeal, it was possible, as James Madison 
suggested at the Philadelphia convention, that once a sufficient 
number of states submitted petitions. Congress itself would pro-
pose amendments and spare the nation the ordeal of a conven-
tion.'~' But Congress would be under no obligation to do so, and 
some members of each house may have preferred to see what re-
sults would come from a convention rather than do the difficult 
work of proposing amendments themselves. 
It can never be known how close the nation came to a sec-
ond convention as the Constitution was going into effect. Many 
Americans in 1787-1788 believed that it had been ratified with 
the understanding that the new Congress would immediately 
propose explicit protections for individual rights. If Madison had 
not been in the U.S. House in the first session, Congress would 
not likely have proposed such amendments. With demands for a 
second convention coming not only from opponents but also 
from some supporters of the Constitution, congressional failure 
to propose amendments may well have been the catalyst for 
enough states to petition Congress. At a minimum, such a con-
vention would have added to the instability and uncertainty sur-
rounding the new government. If the convention approved 
amendments, they almost certainly would have drastically al-
tered the plan devised by the delegates in Philadelphia. 
142. Madison's Notes. supra note 2. at 649. 
